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INTRODUCTION 
The well-known statement that a primary goal of a company is maximization of its 
shareholders wealth. In seeking for such companies which are ready to take care about their 
owners, investors come to stock exchange and choose a company or a few to buy stocks assuming 
that this action assure increase in wealth. This mechanism has already been working since 1602 
while first stock exchange was founded in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. By now, there are about 
200 stock exchanges all over the world and each technologically literate individual has access to 
global market of securities. Institutional investors and companies are significant players of stock 
market as well. Regardless, what kind of an investor takes part, one of major aim is still financial 
benefit.  
While experts are disputing about what is real value for shareholders and shifting to 
“welfare” definition at the root of the issue [Hart, Zingales,2017], the earthy problem is continuing 
to exist: how to make money on stocks? The answer may vary depending on peculiarities and 
intrinsic purposes of an investors. Nevertheless, in this research paper it is suggested to look at 
delisting as a tool of shareholder wealth’s management.  
Delisting is the removal of a listed company from a stock exchange [Martinez, 2017]. 
Basically, going private is the opposite phenomena to IPO (Initial Public Offering). During recent 
decades, going private has been considered as more common and understandable decisions for 
participants of financial markets. Leverage Buy-Outs or LBOs as a way to go private became a 
boom in US market in early 1980s while in Europe first wave occurred in the 1990s. [Djama, 
Martinez, Serve, 2012]. Delisting can be caused by involuntary and voluntary reasons. One of the 
most common reason for involuntary delisting is low both financial and operational performance. 
It is often occasion for the companies, which were forced to leave a stock exchange, to have lower 
prices of stocks and lower market capitalization comparing with benchmarks [Seguin, Smoller, 
1997]. Poor performance leads to sequence of the events: a company underperforms - investors 
loose interest to this company - lack of funding for current operational activities - bankruptcy or 
forced leaving of a stock exchange because of lack of resources to maintain requirements for being 
listed [Angel et al, 2004, Harris t al, 2008]. Among other reason for voluntary delisting is violations 
of listing requirements [Sanger, Peterson, 1990]. This research paper is focused on voluntary 
delisting phenomena. 
Voluntary delisting is mainly caused by 2 groups of reasons connected with cost-benefit 
trade off and corporate governance. Being listed is not free of charge activity and it leads to 
increase of liabilities. Usually, companies expect benefits by being publiс such as cheaper raising 
the capital comparing with debt, enhancing of public image and prestige, share of control (in some 
cases), facilitation of M&A deals and others [Goetzmann, Rouwenhorst, 2005]. Nevertheless, 
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there are cases when public companies are considered to be undervalued by market and investors, 
consequently, these companies’ stocks cost less than it is expected and benefits of being listed are 
less than liability load. Thus, such companies decide to go private [Weir et al,2005; Maupin et al, 
1984, Opler et al, 1993]. Listing costs are divided into direct and indirect. First group is associated 
with registration process and underwriting fees, annual payments and costs of trading. Indirect 
cost includes agency costs and compliance costs: cost of audit and disclosure [Leuz, 2008; 
Thomsen et al, 2014]. For example, annual fee for being listed on London Stock Exchange (Main 
Market) is from 5400 UK pounds to 54000 UK pounds depending on market capitalization (VAT 
20% must be added as well) [London Stock Exchange, 2018]. Also, in case if a company has no 
need in funds raised during trading of its stocks, i.e. because of choice of alternative sources, then 
it comes to conclusion that benefits of being listed are not sufficiently covers corresponding costs 
[Bharath et al, 2010, Martinez et al, 2011]. Related to corporate governance purposes for voluntary 
delisting are discussed in the literature as crucial. After IPO a company is led to separation of 
management from owners (stockholders) which triggers the problem among principal and agent. 
External shareholders put additional attention to managers’ activities. This fact creates some level 
of pressure for controlled managers and arising of costs for checkup. Moreover, the process of 
strategical decision making becomes slower since presence of the common approvals. At the same 
time, under consideration among experts is agency problem in terms of delisting is free cash flow 
distribution. It implies that managers are tended to invest FCF in projects with negative NPV 
instead of distribution of funds among shareholders [Mehran, Peristiani, 2009].  
Voluntary going private can be completed by different types of transactions which will be 
overviewed in this research paper:  
1) Institutional Buy-Out (including Leveraged Buy-out form); 
2) Management Buy-out; 
3) Management Buy-in; 
4) Squeeze-out; 
5) Deregistration or “going dark”; 
6) Mergers with other company; 
7) Acquisition by other company (not institutional player). 
Recently it was found out that a part of investors is scared of delisting phenomena and 
consider it like a “horror” of the stock market [Ross, 2009]. However, there are evidences that 
some market players find delisting as an opportunity to “pocket handsome returns” [Mahesh, 
Walavalkar, 2012]. This chance arises due to premium paid to investors during voluntary going 
private process. For instance, while Alfa Laval was making delisting in 2011, its shareholders 
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received about 44% of return. Thus, the strategy of earning on going private deals seems to be 
attractive alternative to well-known practices of making money on stock exchange. The main 
issue here is to understand how to estimate the probability of the fact that a firm will voluntary 
go private. Therefore, the research goal is to identify drivers of delisting process in order to 
build investment strategy for potential beneficiaries of the going private transactions.  Research 
questions to be answered for the achievement of stated goal: 
7) To make the theoretical overview of the research problem with identification of nature and 
principles related to delisting phenomena; 
8) To analyze the main reasons for voluntary delisting; 
9) To overview procedures for going private transactions; 
10) To conduct an empirical study regarding evaluation of variables influenced the decision to 
delist; 
11) To provide the recommendations applicable for managers and individuals; 
12) To make a general conclusion on the research paper summing up all the results and 
confirming of achievement the stated goal.  
The delisting phenomena is investigated on the example of London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
LSE by middle of 2017 is considered to be 3rd largest stock exchange in the world by market 
capitalization of listed companies (6,19 trillion USD). Stocks are traded either on Main Market 
with strict requirement for being listed according to FSA or on Alternative Investments Market 
(AIM) with less tough requirements and focused on young and innovative companies. Two 
markets are different in terms of corresponding risks, sizes of companies and their growth 
opportunities. That is why it is interesting to form a sample from companies listed and delisted 
from LSE to take into account these aspects too. The hypothesis which are tested in this paper are 
divided into two groups accordingly to reason for voluntary delisting: cost-benefit trade off and 
corporate governance. More accurately, the variables might have influence on decision to go 
private are distributed to first or second group.  
To conduct research next sources of information was used: relevant scientific researches, 
providers of market news such as credited newspapers and journals, professional periodical 
literature, manuals for technical implementation of econometric models and functions. The data 
for sample was taken from databases: Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream, Bloomberg, 
ZEPHYR and from official web-site of LSE and companies.  
The topic of master thesis is considered to be actual and relevant nowadays. This paper 
could be useful for investment managers in corporations, hedge funds and private investors. 
Knowledge about factors affected motivation of traded companies to go private voluntary helps to 
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create hedge beneficial schemes. Basically, application of this research can be interesting for 
building of the whole strategy for earning money on delisting. In general, the investigation has 
high practical significance. Going deeper, it could be helpful tool for creation of new financial 
instruments (i.e. derivatives) against delisting.  
The master thesis has following structure. In the first chapter the in-depth literature 
overview of delisting phenomena is provided with subsequent formulation of hypotheses. In 
second chapter the empirical study and results of research are presented. Afterwards, the 
recommendations are given and summing up of results is concluded.  
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1. Definition of delisting phenomena 
To begin with, by the definition delisting is removal of a publicly traded company from a 
stock exchange and has been becoming more and more important for investigation due to its 
economic effect [Martinez, Serve, Djama, 2015].  
Since delisting is the opposite phenomenon to Initial Public Offering (IPO). The theoretical 
overview is started with the discussion of main reasons for going public. The first form of issuing 
public shares relates to “publicani” in Roman Republic. It was a legal party and its property was 
divided into parts. These parts were traded on over-the-counter (OTC) market at the Roman 
Forum. Prices of shares had high volatility and speculation was appreciated. Nevertheless, the 
history of “publicanis” found its end with the fall of Roman Republic [Chancellor, 1999].  
The first company which did IPO was Dutch India Company or VOC (the abbreviation is 
from Dutch translation of the name). The firm offered its shares to raise capital and became listed 
on Amsterdam stock exchange in 1602 [Stringham, 2015].  
Being public brings the number of benefits which companies try to get despite the 
corresponding costs. Among them:  
1) Access to cheaper capital.  
Minimization the cost of capital is one of the primary motivations for companies to go 
public [Brau, Fawcett, 2006]. In the period between 1980 and 2010 $669,42 billion was attracted 
via IPO on the US’s stock exchanges [Ritter, 2011]. Becoming listed provides an access to huge 
number of potential investors. On the early stages of growth companies can be financed by own 
capital, business angels, venture funds or loans. Nevertheless, one day for the further development 
the bigger amounts of money will be required. Attraction of the necessary capital can be expensive 
through the debt; thus, owners start to seek for alternatives. Among them, IPO which allows to get 
an access to cheaper money after placing its stocks publicly.  
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2) Enhancing of public image and prestige.  
The public status enhance recognition among participants of a market as well as general 
increase of awareness in society. This fact allows to take better position in negotiation with 
counterparties, i.e. debt holders, suppliers, customers, even government during implementation of 
initiatives, etc. [Holden, 1989]. 
3) Facilitation of M&A deals. 
Entrepreneurs who are interested in selling their business find very attractive to maximize 
their profit through enhancing the firm’s value via being listed. The acquisition gives opportunity 
to obtain higher return than from outright sale [Zingales, 1995]. Jian Huang in his research released 
in 2017 conducted with the sample of “all commitment IPOs from 1985 to 2008” with available 
in Thomson Financial SDC data found that institutions made large investments in companies 
which did IPO and consequently became participants of mergers and acquisition deals.   
Recently there was another famous evidence of the third benefit from IPO. PayPal went 
public in order to be acquired by eBay as previously they did not manage to negotiate the price. In 
order to mitigate this problem, PayPal did IPO and obtained the certified value for its shares by 
equity market. Afterwards, eBay acquired the service at 20% premium. This case is also called as 
“dual tracking” [FT, 2006].   
4) Financial visibility.  
First of all, to become public a company needs to go through the strict procedure of listing 
on a stock exchange. The next steps stay behind the public status: meeting underwriting, 
registration process, meeting audit requirements, registration statement preparation and other 
issues [Taylor, 1988]. Thus, it is kind of achievement for a company to become public.  After IPO 
such a firm are required to meet federal and a stock exchange’s regulations to remain the public 
status, including total disclosure. Consequently, complying with formal rules, a company earns its 
credibility. This fact helps not only within external relationships with stakeholders but also for 
self-control. A firm can obtain the clear picture of financial situation and the market’s perception, 
which leads to more effective decision-making process.   
Delisting is divided into two types: voluntary and involuntary [Macey, 2008]. The 
involuntary delisting is driven by obligatory designation of the legislative parties. The main 
reasons to be forced to leave the stock exchange are frauds and any other violation of market rules 
or financial constraints of a listed company. Involuntary delisting is considered to be unattractive 
and unwanted scenario for both a company and investors [Beker, Kennedy, 2002]. 
 This research paper is focused on voluntary type of delisting as the alternative opportunities 
for obtaining benefits participating on a stock exchange. 
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described further in this chapter. Firstly, it is vital to understand history and nature of the 
phenomenon.  
 As the American stock market was always foremost, the wave of going private transactions 
via LBOs (leveraged buyouts) started here in the 1990s. In Europe, delisting wave started in the 
2000s in the form of BOSO (buyout offer with squeeze-out) [Ventoruzzo, 2010]. This difference 
is explained by the size of shareholder base: typically, smaller in United States, while larger in 
Europe [Faccio, Lang, 2002].  
 Reasons for going private are vary and depend on a company’s peculiarities. Being public 
is associated with corresponding costs: direct and indirect. First group includes expenses for 
registration, underwriting fees, annual payments, and cost of trading. Second group is more 
complicated and involves different outgoings. Firms decide to go private to decrease costs, which 
form the causes of voluntary delisting.  
 Delisting in contrast to IPO phenomenon is not that investigated by now. Nevertheless, 
there the number of researches devoted to public-to-private transactions. Summarizing the 
concepts and findings, the list of reasons for voluntary delisting figured out by authors can be 
observed. A few researchers found that companies which are undervalued by market can be tended 
to go private [Mauphin et al, 1984, Opler et al, 1993, Helpern et al, 1999, Weir et al, 2005, Bharath 
et al, 2010]. Indeed, if market estimate the potential of a traded company less than it is expected 
by the management and owners, then being public brings additional liabilities’ load instead of 
advantages of such a status. The deeper discussion about benefits of being public for a firm is 
discussed in next part of this chapter. Another group of authors pointed out that companies which 
are smaller are more likely to go private as they cannot maintain cost for public status and benefit 
from being traded tradeoff [Kieschnick, 1998, Kim et al, 1991, Engel et al, 2007, Becker et al, 
2008, Weir et al, 2008]. For smaller firms costs become relatively more comparing with other 
expenses states than for big companies and harder to allocate. However, the majority of researchers 
argued that low growth potential affects positively the delisting outcome [Kim et al, 1991, Weir 
et al, 2005, Wright et al, 2006, Leuz, 2008, Martinez et al, 2011, Pour et al, 2013]. Growth potential 
in the previous analysis was estimated using Market-to-Book ratio, Tobin’s Q and net sales growth 
rate. MB ratio as well as Tobins’ Q mirrors the market perception of a company. The higher is 
expectation of possible beneficiaries, the less probability of going private. One of the spread 
research opinions is focused on the evidence that companies with lower sales growth are more 
inclined to go private [Lehn et al, 1989, Pour et al, 2013]. Among other reasons there are illiquidity 
of stocks [Achleitner et al, 2013, Mehran et al, 2010, Becker et al, 2008] and higher leverage 
[Bharath et al, 2010, Leuz et al, 2008, Martinex, 2011]. The more detailed overview will be 
provided below in this chapter.  
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Some causes are driven by prevalence of monetary expenses over potential benefits of 
being public, but some issues can be arisen because of agency problems. Traded companies are 
operating under certain legislative normative inverted to decision-making processes, the level of 
disclosure and other factors which affect corporate governance principles. Delisting can decline 
the effect of agency costs and several experts found the evidence of the fact that internal conflict 
of interests may lead to decision to go private. Assumptions reflected agency costs were tested as 
hypotheses about the impact of insider ownership [Maupinet et al, 1984, Marosi et al, 2007], board 
structure in terms of presence of independent directors and distinct Chief Executive Officer [Leuz 
et al, 2008, Lee et al, 1992], anti-takeover provision [Becker, Pollet, 2008] and others. The most 
doubtful is hypothesis about free cash flow distribution in terms of agency costs suggested by 
Jensen in 1986, proved by number of studies [Opler et al,1993, Leuz et al, 2008, Lehn et al, 1989] 
and disproved by several researches [Servaes, 1994, Kieschnisck, 1998, Halpern et al, 1999, 
Bharath et al, 2010]. 
Generalizing, voluntary delisting phenomenon is driven by two groups of factors 
associated with cost benefit tradeoff and agency costs.  
While involuntary delisting has negative impact on shareholders’ wealth, voluntary 
delisting has the strongly positive economic consequence. Usually, investors obtain premium to 
market price while shares are bought out. The table 1 sums up the results of different 
investigations.  
Table 1. Voluntary delisting - economic effect on shareholders' wealth 
Researchers Year Sample Effect on shareholders’ wealth 
De Angelo and Rice 1984 
81 transactions 
(1973 - 1980) 
Premium=56,3% (40 days) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
30,4% 
Kaplan 1989 
76 transactions - 
MBOs (1980 - 1986) 
Premium=42,3% (60 days) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 26% 
Lehn and Poulsen 1989 
263 transactions - 
LBOs (1980 - 1987) 
Premium=36,1% (20 days) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
20,5% 
Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan 
and Davidson 
1992 
58 transactions - 
MBOs (1983 - 1989) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
19,18% 
Andres,Betzer and Weir 2007 
115 transactions - 
LBOs (1997 - 2005) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
24,2% 
Renneboog, Simons and 
Wright 
2007 
177 transactions - 
LBOs (1997 - 2003) 
Premium=40%  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
29,28% 
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Sannajust 2010 
399 transactions 
(2000 - 2007) - Europe 
and US 
Premium=25% (Europe), 34% (US) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
13,57% (Europe), 34,08% (US) 
Geranio and Zannotti 2012 
106 transactions 
(2000-2005) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
18,7% 
Boubaker,Cellier and 
Rouatbi 
2014 
323 transactions - 
BOSOs (2002 - 2011) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns= 
10,19% 
 
Based on the information above, it can be concluded that voluntary delisting in fact can be 
considered as a tool for shareholders’ and other possible beneficiaries’ wealth management.  
1.2. Classification of delisting processes: main procedures and principles  
Voluntary delisting can be made through completion of different types of public-to-private 
transactions. Delisting assumes 100% buying out of shares in free float which are available on the 
stock exchange for open trading. The overview of main procedures is provided in this part.  
1) Institutional Buy-Out (including Leveraged Buy-out form). 
Institutional Buy-Outs (IBOs) are characterized as the type of a deal while institutional investor 
initiates this event. A venture funds, private equity funds, commercial banks, insurance 
companies and others can act as an acquirer [Amess, Wright, 2010]. The most common form 
of IBO in terms of delisting processes is Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) which is accompanied by 
borrowing of money with assets acted as collateral for this debt. According to research of 
Kaplan and Stromberg released in 2009, more than 5000 LBOs were completed in the period 
from 2005 to 2007 all over the world for the 1,6 billion USD. LBOs deals were considered to 
be extremely profitable for investors. Nevertheless, the success here depends on management 
team of acquired company and their ability to shift from corporate thinking to an 
entrepreneurial style of governance in order to give the new brief to “again-private” company 
[Schwarts, Weinstein, 1989]. After LBO, a company becomes oriented on long-term benefits 
rather than on short-term and mostly personal rewards (i.e. managers’ bonuses). Leveraged 
Buy-Outs are statistically the most used type of going private deal in United Kingdom and 
United States [Djama, Martinez, Serve, 2012]. Classical LBO target company has next 
peculiarities [Taylor, 1988]: 
- It has big amount of tangible assets as the collateral for debt; 
- Growth initiatives with lower corresponding costs for development since debt requires 
cash to pay off; 
- Stable market position allowing to meet obligations.  
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Therefore, going back to topic of this paper, LBOs is the one of the most recognizable ways to 
go private for a company. Investors which are interested in obtaining gain on delisting process 
should be aware of LBOs and notice any announcements. It is vital to pay attention on the 
companies which can meet 3 stated above peculiarities during the filtering for the prediction 
of delisting. The average premium for shareholders during buy out is about 20% over market 
price [Eckbo, 2008].  
2) Management Buy-out (MBO). 
An MBO is the kind of a deal while a existing management team purchase a business 
[Scholes, Westhead, Burrows, 2008]. Not long-time age, Management Buy Out was an 
instrument to “divest small subsidiaries or to hand-on control in family-run private companies” 
[Wright, Coyne, 1985]. The enlargement of usage of debt or mezzanine financing reflected in 
total value of MBOs in last decade of XX century [Thompson, 1991]. MBOs are inwrought 
with going private transactions. Mostly, this kind of deals is associated with reduction of 
agency costs of being public and its consequences in additional expenses for monitoring and 
bonding of executive managers by owners(shareholders) [Jensen, Fama, 1983]. Transfer of 
ownership fully to managers as the result of an MBO provides opportunity to superpose 
managerial incentives and beneficial interest related to ownership in profit generation. 
Managerial Buy Out reduces informational asymmetry between owners and managers which 
affects positively the overall efficiency due to general reduction of intermediate stops in 
decision-making and corresponding costs.  
Barrie Pearson in its work devoted to successful MBO selected the criteria of suitability 
of a company to be a target for such type of deals. Among them: 
- A company has sufficient part of tangible assets including working capital in comparison 
with suggested price for buying out; 
- A company which makes losses. The management team could be interested in 
implementation of new initiatives in the private company to put it back on the rails; 
- A “Cash cow” company which is mature on the market it operates (“Cash cow” is 
definition from BCG matrix means that a company obtains big market share in the mature 
industry). Such a company is stable in terms of positive cash flows and considered to be 
attractive for privatization due to no necessity to carry listing direct and indirect costs for 
capitalization.  
To sum up, MBO deals as the way to go private should be monitored by the stakeholders 
of delisting process. The main facts on which the attention should be paid are the existence of 
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principal-agent controversies, i.e. related media announcements, and stated criteria of a 
potential target company for buying.  
3) Management Buy-in (MBI). 
Management Buy- Ins are characterized by including the hiring of external managers 
for acquisition deal in order to support the efficiency of completion and achievement of stated 
for such transactions goal [Thompson, 1991].  MBI often takes place when the level of existing 
management team’s efficiency is estimated as poor while the product/service of a company 
seems to be prospective.   
4) Squeeze-out. 
Comparing with popularity of LBOs in UK and US, in Continental Europe “a Buy-out 
Offer with Squeeze-Out (BOSO)” is the prevailing type [Faccio, Lang, 2002]. This kind of a 
transaction is determined by the exercising of controlling shareholders’ rights to cash out the 
minorities according to current legislative background: a firm becomes private after closing 
the capital. Depending on the country, the controlling shareholders can make minorities to sell 
their parts with guarantee for no losses. For instance, French legislation allows BOSOs while 
no less than 90% of voting rights are in charge of majorities. The particular characteristic of 
BOSO that institutional investors are not involved in the deal in contrast with LBO, for 
instance. Thus, mostly, Buy-out Offer with Squeeze-Out is provoked by insiders, often family.  
5) Deregistration or “going dark”. 
Deregistration is the way for traded companies to decrease its publicity by “going dark” 
and shifting to OTC markets. Therefore, deregistration is not fully equal to going private. 
Overviewed here type of transaction does not require voting procedure and cash out, however, 
there might be stocks’ repurchase. In fact, tender offer in case of deregistration is not the event 
required the attention of stakeholders of a deal as companies which go dark mostly are limited 
in cash to suggest relevant premium [Farris, 2009]. Thus, deregistration is not the most 
profitable situation for investors who are seeking for gain from transaction. Nevertheless, for 
current shareholders there are some advantages of going dark. Among them: 
- Cost reduction due to excluding expanses for being listed on primary exchange which can 
affect positively distribution of cash between a company’s incentives; 
- Maintenance of trading on the Pink Sheets; 
- Decrease of disclosure requirements enhance competitive background of a company’s 
activities because of keeping confidential strategical issues; 
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- Simplification of corporate governance rules, i.e. requirements to Board of Directors.  
6) Mergers and acquisitions (with/by other company not institutional player) 
M&A deals which includes a public company as a target and an unlisted company from 
the other side are the considered to be equal to going private transactions as soon as 
shareholders of the target have an opportunity to exit without losses [EY, 2013]. The decision 
about M&A transactions are usually correspond to strategic resolution among companies trying 
to obtain benefits from a synergy, including pros of becoming private.  
1.3. Case Study: Cadbury 
The theoretical side of the delisting phenomenon is finding its evidence in the case of 
public-to-private transaction which are made on global stock exchanges, including London Stock 
Exchange. For better understanding, it suggested to overview the Cadbury takeover by Kraft 
Foods. The small discussion is supposed to represent market perception of the phenomenon and 
to look at opinions of different stakeholders of the deal. As part of case study has more applied 
character, the analysis will be based on evaluation of information from credited journalistic articles 
published in financial world related mass-media such as Financial Times, Independent, BBC, 
Telegraph, The Guardian and others. 
Cadbury is the famous international confectionery firm founded in UK almost 195 years 
ago. It was second player in the industry after Mars and now it is subsidiary of Mondelez 
International (after acquisition by Kraft Food in 2010). The company has long successful history 
behind, it has the strong and recognizable product brands’ portfolio. Stocks of the Cadbury was 
traded on Main Market of London Stock Exchange from 1984 till 2010 and were included in FTSE 
1000 index. In 2009, Kraft Foods announced the intention to acquire Cadbury. It was a bid by the 
company from United States for British confectionery company, the deal was completed in 2010. 
Despite the fact that it is story about hostile takeover from the first impression, the insider story of 
the deal shows interesting facts about series of rational managerial decision of Cadbury turning 
this transaction in favorable for both its management and investors [BBC, 2014].  
To begin with, Cadbury and then merged Cadbury Schweppes was run by John Sunderland, 
very effective manager, and in 2000 his police was focused on expansion of the product portfolio 
by buying other firms. In 2002, the president and his prospective assistant Todd Stitzer decided to 
go into chewing-gum story as fast-growing and high-marginal products. This step was also the 
attempt to hedge the decrease in profit margins and sales, in general, of core chocolate business. 
Nevertheless, the penetration into new gum markets did not solve existing problem.  
New chairman Roger Carr came in 2008 found that the declining of growth and poorer 
performance of such a giant as Cadbury was connected with lower level of implementation of 
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innovative technologies, lower capital expenditures in general and lower marketing expenses 
comparing to the rivals. The price of stock of Cadbury reacted relatively to the position of the 
company: slowly dropping. 2006 was the crucial year for Cadbury with public scandal around 
found Salmonella in a few factories and the company’s performance dropped down even more the 
insider talks were about making the great changes in the company’s future: be bought to reorganize 
business [Independent, 2016]. In the years of management recession in Cadbury, the Trian Fund 
Management (hedge fund) showed the interest in the company. The fund started to buy shares and 
took part in the company recovery strategy including decision to split soft drinks and confectionery 
businesses [The Guardian ,2007]. Nevertheless, at the same time, Trian Fund Management started 
to buy stocks of American Kraft Foods in sufficient stake and again took part in the company’s 
governance using its control power [FT, 2009]. Apparently, in 2009, against the background of 
non-improving Cadbury performance, the bid from Kraft Foods was received [Telegraph, 2013]. 
The experts saw in this situation suspicious coincidence, despite Peltz’s rejection of the fact 
[FT,2010].  
Nevertheless, the initial bid for $16,3 billion was rejected despite the internal 
understanding of Cadbury that it is opportunity to go out from the public status for proceedings 
management decisions in more efficient way and share the expertise. The offered amount of money 
was considered to be too little for such an old company with the strong brand portfolio. Moreover, 
the big concern of the management team and employees was regarding loosing of heritage by 
being bought by US company. That is why, lots of stakeholders saw in the proposal of this deal 
the attempt of hostile acquisition.  
In short time, Kraft Foods offered new bid for $17 billion and buying out with cash and 
shares (40% - 300 pence to 60% - 0,2589 shares of Kraft Foods per 1 Cadbury’s share and 
conversion rate 1,66 US dollar for 1 UK pound).  This bid was quickly rejected as well. The 
negotiations were continuing for 4 months and the deal was finally agreed with $19,55 billion offer 
and buying out with bigger proportion of cash - 60% [Reuters, 2010]. The premium for the 
shareholders of Cadbury was not extremely high comparing with other examples of voluntary 
delisting, it was a bit more than 5% (840 pence, where 500 pence in cash and 0,1874 Kraft Foods’ 
stock, and 10 pence dividend against closing price of Cadbury’s stock in 807,4 pence). However, 
comparing with first bid in 755 pence, 840 pence provided 11,26% premium [Telegraph, 2009]. 
The last Cadbury’s stock price before the deal’s completion was heated by the news and enhanced 
attention to the company. Thus, it seems to be more logical to compare with initial offer of Kraft 
Foods to argue about premium and added value for shareholders wealth. Moreover, in respect that 
there were premises to slowing down the Cadbury’s leading position based on financial 
performance and market overview, then there was covert opportunity to Cadbury’s shareholders 
 18 
both to hedge the risk and take a chance to gain benefits from synergy with obtaining some of 
Kraft Foods stocks along with pure cash.  
Stitzer remained the chief executive of Cadbury business in Kraft Foods’ portfolio. The 
acquisition was evaluated by investors as well-done deal as the management team was 
acknowledged as “less skilled at running the business day to day: they were good at the former 
and not at the latter” [FT, 2012]. With retention of the Cadbury’ management, the target company 
obtained access to Kraft distribution facilities and new opportunities for adding value based on 
synergy effect. Notwithstanding of the acquisition type of the deal, this case can be discussed in 
terms of quasi-voluntary delisting:  
1) Wise decision to sell company and delist from stock exchange with increase of 
shareholders’ wealth, especially, on the background of declining performance of Cadbury; 
2) Management team of Cadbury stayed in place and Cadbury business remained detached 
being part of Kraft Foods’ portfolio; 
3) According to journalists’ researches, the partial or full acquisition was concerned by the 
Cadbury’s management team as the way to improve the financial performance. Taking into 
account the fact of suspicious role of Trian Fund Management and following Kraft Foods’ 
bid for Cadbury, it can be assumed that it might be premediated “win-win” strategic 
position; 
4) Triggers for the Cadbury’s going out from the stock market as an independent company 
can be discussed applying the previous theoretical investigation: low sales growth rates, 
conservative investing policy, moderate growth opportunities; 
5) Buying out allows not only to make a relief but also to relocate costs associated with being 
listed as independent company both direct and indirect. 
1.4. Hypothesis formulation 
To meet the main goal of this research paper to select drivers of delisting process in order 
to build investment strategy for shareholders, the empirical study will be conducted. Previously it 
was stated that reasons for voluntary delisting can be divided into two groups: cost-benefit tradeoff 
and agency problems. Consequently, hypotheses will be related to these groups.  
Hypothesis 1. There is negative relationship between growth potential and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
According to published earlier researches, firms which were voluntary delisted from a 
stock exchange had been showing low growth potential comparing with firms stayed traded. As 
fundamentally ROE is incorporated in the numerator of the MB ratio, the choice of the variable is 
justified in terms of growth opportunity. Higher MB ratio shows bigger return on equity for 
investors, so, the firm with lower MB ratio tend to go private more likely in order to hide from 
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public the low growth potential which will lead to decrease in attractiveness of this firm for 
investors [Bharath, Dittmar, 2013]. Market-to-Book ratio reflects the perception of a company by 
a market. If focus not on speculators only but long-term investors, the last type seeks for 
opportunities to enhance their wealth due to sustainable growth of a bought asset. Therefore, in 
case when a firm seems to be low growth potential, then it becomes less attractive as an investment 
chance, which leads to decrease of incoming capital via trading. At the end, it reverts to prevailing 
of costs over benefits from being listed.  
Another indicator of growth potential discussed in relevant literature is net sales growth. 
There is the evidence of significant influence of net sales growth rate on value for shareholders 
[Ataunal et al, 2016]. Chemmanur and his collegues found in their research paper that public firms 
have U-form pattern of changes in sales growth during their life cycle [Chemmanur, He,Nandy, 
2010]. The peak is reached at the time around IPO event and driven by high capital inflow and 
intrinsic motivation of companies’ leaders: productivity enhancement. An outstanding 
performance leads to laying up of the attractiveness for potential investors and increase of gains 
from public status, consequently.  That is why with decreasing of growth rate investors becomes 
less interested in a company with leads to drop of potential benefit of being listed.  The growth 
rate of net sales is historic indicator which explains the facts while Market-to-Book ratio evaluate 
the perspectives of a company. Thus, it seems to be consistent to take into account both metrics as 
feedback and feedforward.  
Hypothesis 2. There is negative relationship between liquidity by volume and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
The higher liquidity of a stock, the lower cost of capital for traded company. Liquidity have 
positive influence on stock price which leads to increase of benefits to be listed [Amihud, 
Mendelson, 2000]. That is why firms with higher volume of transaction aim to go or stay public. 
It is important to understand that here the definition of “liquidity” is narrowed to number of 
transactions with a company’s shares. The turnover of these shares reflects interest of investors to 
the particular firm. The authors of high-credited researches regarding voluntary delisting 
phenomena stated that this factor is vital [Mehran, Peristiani, 2010, Bharath, Dittmar, 2010]. 
According to previous investigations, the failure of the attempt to attract investors’ attention to the 
company, which is expressed through trading volume of its shares, leads to going private since the 
beneficial part of being listed does not exceed corresponding costs.  
Hypothesis 3. There is positive relationship between free cash flow ratio and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Suggested and tested by Jensen in 1986 FCF hypothesis states that there is the evidence 
that a company’s managers spend Free Cash Flows on projects with negative NPV rather than 
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distributes among shareholders. Such decisions might be connected to a reward system i.e. bonuses 
or other factors related to corporate governance. This fact leads to agency problem and 
shareholders become more interested in taking over the control. Nevertheless, the FCF hypothesis 
seems to be controversial if other scientific papers are discussed. Some authors found that 
companies with higher free cash flows are more tended to go private [Maupin et al, 1984]. Others 
claimed that FCF was not confirmed by their researches not for US, not for European market 
[Geranio et al, 2010, Weir et al, 2005, Dittmar et al, 2010]. Thus, the influence of FCF is attractive 
for current research and finding of evidence from London Stock Exchange in different from other 
authors time period. Following the most reliable and deep research [Jensen, 1986], it is assumed 
that higher FCF ratio affects positively on the decision to go private.  
Hypothesis 4. There is positive relation between higher leverage and the decision to 
voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
The impact of leverage on decision to go private is considered to be controversial. On the 
one hand, being highly leveraged a company is interested to go or remain public because of limited 
access to funding [Kim, Weisbach, 2008]. While other researches proved that big leverage may 
signalize that such a company are seeking for “safety” boat, i.e private equity fund, to handle debt 
load [Bhathar, Dittmar, 2009]. In addition, high leverage may affect investment initiatives due to 
cornice of obligations to holders of debt while they are prioritized [Mayers, 1977, Becker et al, 
2008]. This fact leads to slowing down of development focusing on resolution issues regarding 
existing liabilities and decrease in attractiveness to investors. Thus, cost-benefit tradeoff is 
imbalanced as well.  
Hypothesis 5. There is positive relation between percentage of insider owners and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Agency problem is strongly tight to the issue of insider ownership of a company. An insider 
can be either a person or an entity of a firm which should have one or both characteristics [Mehran, 
Peristiani, 2009]: 
“1. Any holder representing 5% or more of the total shares outstanding; 
  2. Any officer or board director of the company, including their related or affiliated 
individuals, families, entities and trusts.” 
Going private allows to meet more efficiently insider’s interests. Acquiring of stocks in 
free floating by insiders provides the opportunity to cross the interest of shareholders and managers 
and their view on value maximization and decrease the effort for decision making [Rennebooget, 
2007, Croci et al, 2011]. Last means that alignment of managerial vision and vision of owners 
results in quicker and fully coordinated decision. Meanwhile, analysts of Morgan Stanley claims 
that increase of a company’s investor base affect positively on the its stocks’ liquidity and 
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following raise of the price. Investor base is increased by the number of small individual investors 
[Amibud, Mendelson, 2000]. Thus, by obtaining higher price of its stocks, a company ramps up 
market capitalization and gets the access to cheaper cost of capital, which are considered to be 
ones of the primary goals of being public. Then benefits from being traded prevail over costs 
related to public status. Considering all the views above, the firms with higher insider ownership 
are more likely go private. 
Hypothesis 6. There is negative relationship between importance of access to capital 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
In case if a firm do not see a crucial need in access to capital, it can be messages by low 
capital expenditures relating to net sales [Modigliani et al, 1963, Scott, 1976, Pour et al, 2013]. 
Indeed, based on the analysis of benefits from being private, it is seen that if access to capital is 
not that important and necessary anymore while other pros are irrelevant, then there is no sense to 
bear costs to be listed on stock exchange and meet agency problems in distribution of resources. 
The metric “CAPEX/Net Sales” was suggested in different previous studies as the indicator for 
productivity improvement showing the effect from capital expenditures on market competition 
reflected by revenue [Datta et al, 2013, Custodio, 2014].  Indeed, firms invest in modernization 
and replacement incentives in order to catch the flow of competition and generate more or, at least, 
remain the level. Considering stated above ideas, it can be pointed out that less CAPEX/Net Sales 
ratio, less probable that a firm is in the race for the market position and higher sales using 
aggressive policy regarding capital expenditures. Coming back to the purposes to be public, one 
of them is access to a cheap capital for extensive investments in assets. Therefore, lower 
discussible ratio refers to lower importance of the possibility to arise less expensive resources. In 
its turn, it might be concluded that a company is able to manage sales level with other approaches 
and cost benefit tradeoff is disbalanced while agency problems are always around public status.   
Hypothesis 7. There is positive relation between costs to be listed on stock exchange 
to net income as the performance indicator ratio and the decision to voluntary delist from 
stock exchange. 
Since one of the main reasons for voluntary delisting is the trade-off between costs and 
benefits, then the effect of real listing costs in absolute means in the relation to net income as the 
indicator for potential benefit in real money from being listed is considered to be interesting for 
further investigation. According to Bharath and Dittmar and their research in 2010, the observation 
of cost-benefit trade-off is fair relating with time being public: from IPO to control point. 
Therefore, the AGE variable is included inside the tested model of survival (AGE = number of 
days from IPO to determined date or delisting date).  
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Hypothesis 8. There is negative relation between the size of a company and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
“Size effect” was well-research by Dang and Li in 2015 with the conclusion that Ln(Total 
Assets) is one of the proven measures for determination of a firm’s size. The variable size acts like 
an appraisal tool for ability of a company to be public. It includes the fact that bigger firms have 
higher expenses to be transparent (disclose financial performance) while these costs become 
relatively less than for small companies and easier to allocate.  
For better organization of logic for hypotheses formulation the figure 1 is provided where 
is green cells indicate positive relationship and red cell vice versa.  
 
Figure 1. Summary of hypotheses formulated 
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CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
2.1. Research design 
 The decision to go private is binary choice model: a company goes private or stays publicly 
traded on a stock exchange. The dependent variable is the event of delisting, which is estimated 
with econometrics models.  
 If consider classical linear probability model (LMP) (1) with OLS, then it should be 
adopted to the expected options of dependent variable y: 1 - delisting, 0 - staying traded.  ! = 	$% +	$'(' +⋯+ $*(+ + , = ($ + ,  (1) 
 Then to include conditional probability, the formula is reorganized to meet the requirement: Pr(! = 1|() = 3(!|(; $),  Pr(! = 1|() = ($,  
At the same time: Pr(! = 0|() = 1 − ($.  
 Nevertheless, there are list of disadvantages in LPM’s application [Soderbom, 2009]: 
1. The mix of some independent variables can result in predictions which might be less than 0 or 
bigger than 1. Despite the definition of interval from 0 to 1, some can turn out outside, which 
devoid such predictions of meaning. Also, it is not completely right to state that a probability 
relates linearly to continual covariates for all viable values, since continuously enhancing regressor 
might drive probability above 1 or below 0.  
2. Since dependent variable has value either 1 or 0, then residuals can have two options: 
 1 − $(	89: − $(. Thus,  <8=(,|() = Pr(! = 1|()[1 − ($]' + Pr(! = 0|() [−($]' = ($[1 − ($]' + (1 − ($)[−($]'= ($[1 − ($], 
Where OLS estimator remains unbiased, however, t-values might be not right as residuals 
are heteroskedastic by default. Moreover, as there are only 1 and 0 for residuals, they are not 
supposed to be distributed normally. 
Considering the information above, LPM can be bared in mind as the very beginning stage 
in the case of binary analysis. Nevertheless, there are some problems which are easier solved with 
LPM rather than more complex models, i.e. logit and probit [Miguel, Satyanath, Sergenti, 2004].  
As this research is focused on the complex task, the LPM seems to be not appropriate for 
usage. In econometrics, the most famous models for binary response are logit and probit, which 
mitigate problems are faced to Linear Probability Model.  
First application of logit regression to the financial issue was in 1977 regarding triggers for 
a commercial bank failure [Martin, 1997]. A few years later, Ohlson used logit “multivariate 
conditional probability model to business failure prediction” [Ohlson, 1980]. Probit model was 
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integrated in financial studies first in 1984 by professor Zmijewski for prediction of economic 
distress of companies.  
Logistic regression (logit) as well as probit do not use linear dependency. Logit do not 
consider normal distribution while probit takes into consideration that covariates are normally 
distributed, and this model has “fatter tails”, which means the existence of bigger amount of 
observations in the end of the function [Kliestik, Kocisova, Misankova, 2015]. If there is no 
“extreme” observations in a sample, then there is little difference between these two models.   
Mathematical form of logistic models begins from the equation: Pr(! = 1|() = @(($), 
where 0 < @(($) < 1	89:	@	BC	D,E,F8GBHI	:I9CBG!	J,9DGBK9	(LMN). G is not linear function 
and OLS is not applicable. CDF growing in ($ as follow: Pr(! = 1|() → 1	8C	($ → ∞ Pr(! = 1|() → 0	8C	($ → −∞. 
 As delisting as an event is not flat regarding time, therefore, usage of logit and probit 
models leads to not realistic limitations about identity of hazard rate (the going private solution) 
over time. This shortcoming can be got over with including a duration dependent parameter in the 
model of binary choice. One of the resolution is application of the Cox Duration (or Proportional 
Hazard) Model which is survival model - derivative from logit/probit approaches [Jones, Branton, 
2005].  
Cox Proportional Hazard Model created in 1972 is used for investigation of the factors 
influenced on the final decision about going private (to delist). This model is included in groups 
of survival models which obtain next characteristics (in case of delisting the survival event is 
staying public): 
1) «The dependent variable or response is the waiting time until the occurrence of a well-defined 
event; 
2) Observations are censored, in the sense that for some units the event of interest has not 
occurred at the time the data are analyzed; 
3) There are predictors or explanatory variables whose effect on the waiting time we wish to 
assess or control» [Rodriguez, 2007] 
In case of delisting the survival, event is staying public.  
Cox model helps to predict how much time after IPO a company takes to go private. The 
variables in model relates as follow (2): 
 
where Q – age of the firm in year t (in model in this paper it is in days); 
ℎSQT(UV%,W∙$Y = 	ℎZ(Q)I([\]^,_∙`) (2) 
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ℎSQT(UV%,W∙$Y –probability (conditional) that a company goes private in a stated year (considering 
that this did not go private in the previous years); (UV%,W∙$ - vector of all covariates; 
i*β – parameters which model estimates; ℎZ(Q) – baseline hazard, equals to the conditional probability that a company goes private while 
all covariates are equal to 0(zero). The hazard can vary over time.  a8b8=:	c8GBK = 	 d([\]^,_∙e)d([\]^,f∙e) (3) 
Transforming Hazard Ratio (3) above to word equation tight to state in this research 
problem: 	a8b8=:	c8GBK= 	 9,EgI=	KJ	DKEh89BIC	iI9G	h=BH8GI	B9	GℎI	!I8=	G9,EgI=	KJ	DKEh89BIC	FBCGI:	B9	8	CGKDj	I(Dℎ89kI	8G	GℎI	gIkB99B9k	KJ	!I8=	G 
Survival models and hazard function are considered in the section of duration models. 
Many duration models are estimated by maximum likelihood [Davidson, MacKinnon, 2004].  
2.2. Sample and Data Collection 
2.2.1. Company Data Selection 
The considering period is from 2009 to 2017 (the most recent reports). The year 2009 was 
chosen as the first year after Global Economic Crisis in 2009 and as the first period of recovering 
after this event which was accompanied with list of bankruptcies and general decrease in 
companies’ performance.  The London Stock Exchange was chosen for conduction of the analysis. 
The figure 2 provide statistics about IPO by values for period from 2005 to 2017. Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKEX), London Stock Exchange (LSE), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
NASDAQ, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)  are largest stock 
exchanges in the world by IPO value. London Stock Exchange among them, is the top on European 
part of the world as well keeping the status of the world’s most international stock exchange by 
IPO devision. London’s IPOs have become even more international, with nine of the top ten IPOs 
by size coming from outside. That underlines the recognized status of LSE as the worlds most 
matured financial center. From the figure 2 it is seen that NYSE and TSE have bigger value of 
IPOs offhand. Despite the performance of NYSE, LSE was preferred due to higher level of 
informational disclosure which makes the research to be reliable. TSE, in its turn, has limited 
access for foreign companies while Asian companies are very specific and requires special 
advanced corresponding knowledge while information about listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange is 
limited.   
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Figure 2. Information about values of IPOs from 2005 to 2017 (Source: Thompson Reuters) 
 
This research is focused on London Stock Exchange both Main Market and AIM, and 
companies listed there and delisted from there. Companies traded on both markets are grouped 
into sectors. The distribution is shown on the figures 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of companies traded on Main Market by sector 
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Figure 4. Distribution of companies traded on AIM by sector 
 
In the table 2, the information about changes in companies traded on LSE are presented 
where is 2009 is starting point and 2017 is ending point with last related report for 2016. The figure 
5 visualizes information provided in table 2. Here is necessary to pay attention on fact that as well 
as some companies do delisting, new players appear due to IPO.  
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Table 2. Information about changes in companies traded on LSE          
 
 
Figure 5. Changes in the lists of traded companies over the time 
The list of trading companies for each year was taken from the official web site of London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). The sample of delisted companies was taken from Zephyr database. The 
in-put filters were next: 
1) Deal type: Institutional buy-out, MBI / MBO, Share buyback, Acquisition;  
The criteria are chosen on the base of theoretical overview of the possible ways to voluntary 
go private and available in the database. All the deals imply 100% buyback of shares in free 
float. 
2) Current deal status: Completed;  
3) Country primary addresses: United Kingdom (UK-based for Target);  
4) Time period: on and after 01/01/2009 and up to and including 31/12/2017 (completed-
confirmed).  
Year Number of companies listed on LSE
Number of companies 
delisted (voluntary and 
involuntary) by beginning 
of year
2009 2788
2010 2669 359
2011 2593 282
2012 2479 280
2013 2448 246
2014 2446 251
2015 2365 284
2016 2268 954
2017 2039 263
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As the result the sample contained 2768 results.  After association with the list of 
companies traded on LSE in any year from 2009 to 2017, there is 209 observations for voluntary 
delisted companies from chosen stock exchange with full presented data for analysis.   
The two samples companies which went or did not were merged into one for further 
analysis using survival model. As the result the total number of unique observation was 5472 with 
fully available information regarding independent variables.  
2.2.2. Sample Data Collection 
Each row of observations’ sample includes dependent variable, dummy variable and 
independent variables. The table 3 provides information about variables in sample: 
Table 3. Description of variables 
 
Variable Code Type of variable Description Data type
Age Age/Age_months/ Age_years independent
Duration from IPO 
date to control date or 
date of a delisting 
deal's completion 
numeric
Turnover by 
Volume Liquidity independent
Number of 
Transaction (in 
thousands)
numeric
FCF ratio FCF_ratio independent Free Cash Flow/Net Sales numeric
Debt-to-Equity DE independent
Total Interest-Bearing 
Debt/Total Book 
Value of Equity
numeric
Insider 
Ownership
INSIDER_  
OWNERSHIP independent
% of insiders owned 
shares of a company numeric
Market-to-Book 
Value MV_BV independent
Market 
Capitalization/Book 
Value of a Company
numeric
CAPEX-to-Sales CAPEX_Sales independent CAPEX/Net Sales numeric
Listing Costs-to-
Net Income ListC_NI independent
Fixed Listing 
Costs/Net Income 
Available to Common
numeric
Size LnTA independent Natural Logarithm of Total Assets numeric
Fact of Voluntary 
Delisting G_private dependent
1 - if  voluntary 
delisted      
0 - if not
binary
Market of LSE Market dummy 1 - if  Main Market    0 - if AIM binary
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Descriptive statistics for variables of the sample is provided in table 4. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 
The independent variables were tested for correlation with Pearson Correlation Coefficient. 
The results are provided in table 5. As it is seen there is no one evidence of strong correlation 
between covariates. However, CAPEX_Sales and FCF_ratio has moderate downhill relationship 
(-0,55 as well as LnTA and Insider_Ownership (-0,48). In first case, the reason for correlation is 
the fact that companies with large FCF are not likely to distribute it on Capital Expenditures. while 
second relationship could be spurious as the nature of variables does not assume similar behavior 
or at least this phenomenon has not been mentioned yet in relevant literature. Weak uphill linear 
relationships are observed for Liquidity and Size variable (0,36), for Market-to-Book Value and 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (0,39), and, lastly, for Size variable and Age (0,38). Indeed, the bigger the 
company, the more likely that it has higher visibility and attractiveness for investors, consequently, 
number of transactions is increasing. At the same time, correlation between size and age is rather 
understandable too: the older the company, the higher probability that it has bigger amount of total 
assets as it has been operating for longer time. The positive linear relationship between Market-
to-Book Value and Debt-to-Equity Ratio can be explained by the assumption that a company 
borrows more for meeting growth opportunities which leads to development of that firm and 
enhancing its position on stock market [Majumdar, 2013]. 
 
Market Luquidity FCF_ratio GrSales DE INSIDER_OWNERSHIP
Mean 0,50 421236,75 -326,59 149,71 47,28 31,64
Standart Error 0,01 28685,82 161,01 62,42 7,91 0,35
Median 0,00 35484,45 8,52 5,46 23,97 27,65
Mode 0,00 2144,10 3,29 2,13 0,00 0,02
Standart Deviation 0,50 2121974,92 11910,71 4617,25 585,08 26,06
Sample Variance 0,25 4502777564460,85 141864894,27 21319036,60 342316,56 679,33
Kurtosis -2,00 257,56 2218,34 3331,25 405,80 -0,74
Skewness 0,00 14,33 -37,73 54,56 -10,47 0,54
Range 1,00 50946768,60 988711,90 299200,52 27821,66 99,86
Minimum 0,00 1,40 -676157,61 -99,93 -18028,00 0,00
Maximum 1,00 50946770,00 312554,29 299100,59 9793,66 99,86
Sum 2735,00 2305007486,20 -1787074,34 819189,06 258725,99 173107,50
Count
MV_BV CAPEX_Sales ListC_NI LnTA (SIZE) Age G_Private
Mean 2,73 6,04 0,75 12,41 5829,83 0,04
Standart Error 0,37 3,20 0,62 0,03 80,71 0,00
Median 1,65 0,02 0,02 12,03 3647,50 0,00
Mode -0,28 0,00 0,16 11,63 2777,00 0,00
Standart Deviation 27,41 236,42 45,60 2,50 5970,68 0,19
Sample Variance 751,57 55895,77 2079,03 6,23 35648996,89 0,04
Kurtosis 585,95 1882,55 5422,30 0,57 3,65 21,12
Skewness -2,66 43,13 73,48 0,64 1,98 4,81
Range 1780,89 11407,09 3456,91 16,14 41760,00 1,00
Minimum -921,91 -2,59 -91,56 5,47 0,00 0,00
Maximum 858,98 11404,50 3365,35 21,61 41760,00 1,00
Sum 14947,76 33039,48 4122,01 67923,11 31900810,00 210,00
Count 5472
5472
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Table 5. Pearson correlation matrix 
 
2.3. Empirical results and discussions 
2.3.1. Analysis of output 
For implementation of Cox Proportional Hazard model for obtained data, the R 
programming software was applied. R has the SURVIVAL package which includes (coxph) 
function. The survival input parameters are age and “public-to-private” deal. Thus, 
surv(time,event) takes into account time as the age of a company in the sample from the IPO date 
to control date or date of a “public-to-private” deal’s completion. At the same time, voluntary 
going private is dummy variable for event: 1 if the event occurred and a company made delisting, 
0 in opposite case. Independent variables are included in the model linearly. The output of the 
applied Cox Proportional Hazard Model is shown in table 6.  
Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazard Model output 
 
 
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Market -1.881e+00 1.524e-01 2.287e-01 -8.227 < 2e-16 ***
Liquidity -1.280e-07 1.086e+00 8.269e-08 -1.547 0.03917 *  
FCF_ratio  2.983e-05 1.000e+00 7.290e-05 0.409 0.68235
GrSales -9.811e-07 1.000e+00 2.313e-05 -0.042 0.96617
DE 2.580e-04 1.064e+00 9.992e-05 2.582 0.00983 ** 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP 6.762e-03 1.007e+00 2.989e-03 2.262 0.02369 *  
MV_BV -2.140e-03 9.979e-01 2.269e-03 -0.943 0.34547
CAPEX_Sales -1.213e-03 9.988e-01 2.677e-03 -0.453 0.65053 
ListC_NI -2.274e-03 9.977e-01 2.358e-02 -0.096 0.92316
LnTA (SIZE) -8.823e-02 1.092e+00 4.425e-02 -1.994 0.04615 *  
Wald test = 109.6  on 10 df,   p=<2e-16
Score (logrank) test = 134.6  on 10 df,   p=<2e-16
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Call:  coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~ market + liquidity + FCF_ratio + 
    GrSales + DE + insider_ownership + mv_bv + capex_sales + 
    ListC_NI + LnTA, data = dt)
Cox Proportional Harard Model
Concordance= 0.693  (se = 0.022)
Rsquare= 0.023 
n= 5472, number of events= 209 
Likelihood ratio test= 129.9  on 10 df,   p=<2e-16
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The likelihood ratio test, Wald test and score (logrank) test above the summary table are 
examining the null hypothesis about the whole model insignificance ($l = 0). The chosen model 
is considered to be significant according to 3 tests provided: p-values<0,05 so the null hypothesis 
is not accepted. Since the sample is enormous, there is no suspicions why p-values in both three 
cases are extremely small. Basically, 2e-16 is the smallest possible number R can demonstrate. R2 
in case of Cox Proportional Hazard Model has not explanatory power and experts do not 
recommend to focus on this measure in survival models [Gillespie, 2006].  
At the same time, not all covariates are examined as significant. The independent variable 
Liquidity, DE (Debt/Equity), INSIDER_OWNERSHIP and LnTA (SIZE) are statistically 
significant at least level of 0,01.  
It is seen that dummy variable “Market” which has information either a company on Main 
Market or AIM is highly significant. It means that it matters on which market the company is more 
tended to voluntary go private was listed. Therefore, companies listed on AIM resulted in higher 
probability to go private. Indeed, AIM consists mainly from innovative, growing companies with 
smaller size. They are riskier comparing with giants on Main Market and attractive for limited part 
of investors with high risk-taking level. Moreover, the strategy of sustainable development is not 
well-examined, therefore, such companies can overestimate their ability to be public (the problems 
and costs related to be listed) and concomitant benefits. 
Covariate “Liquidity” demonstrates that companies with lower turnover by volume of 
transactions were more interested in voluntary delisting. The more liquid a stock, the more 
attractive this company for investors as they are guaranteed by quick exchange procedure. That is 
why, a few aims of being public might be met if the turnover by volume is high: a company 
becomes more visible and provides the opportunity for easier attraction of capital.  
The variable relates to Debt-to-Equity ratio is significant on 0,001 level. Higher leverage 
has positive impact on decision to go private. Companies with high debt load with higher 
probability can require re-structuring of capital. As an option it can be acquisition of such 
companies by institutional investors.  
Another significant insider ownership variable shows that there is positive relation between 
the percentage of share owned by insiders to probability of going private. Actually, to mitigate 
agency problems occurred with obtaining of public status, firms are more likely to voluntary delist 
from stock exchange. 
Lastly, the covariate of size represented as Ln(Total Assets) being significant demonstrates 
that bigger companies are more tended to keep public status as for them cost benefit tradeoff is 
fair and permissible.  
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The exponential coefficient in second column shows multiplicative effect on the hazard, 
basically, hazard rate. The interpretation to each holding over variables constant, the additional 
unit of measurement increases the daily hazard of delisting by a factor of Imn	 = exp	(DKIJ)W.  
It is reasonable to interpret exponential coefficient only for significant variables. For 
market variable the coefficient is -1.881e+00 hazard rate equals to 1.524e-01 which means that 
listing on AIM market increase the probability of being voluntary delisted by 15,24%. For liquidity 
the coefficient is equal to -1.280e-07 while hazard ratio is 1.001e+00 which means that for a 1 unit 
(thousand) increase in turnover the probability e of voluntary delisting decreases by 0,1%. Variable 
reflected Debt-to-Equity ratio has coefficient which is equal to 2.580e-04 while hazard rate is 
1.064e+00. That states that increase for a 1 unit in leverage indicator leads to increase of 
probability of voluntary delisting by 6,4%. Insider ownership variable has coefficient 6.762e-03 
and hazard rate 1.007e+00. It can be concluded that increase for a 1 unit in insider ownership leads 
to increase of probability to go private for 0,7%. Lastly, the significant size variable has coefficient 
equals to -8.823e-02 while hazard rate is 1.092e+00. Thus, with increase for 1 unit in size measured 
via logarithm of Total Assets, the probability of voluntary delisting decreases by 9,2%. 
Analyzing results of applying Cox Proportional Hazard Model to selected data, next 
conclusion about hypotheses testing can be made (table 7).  
Table 7. Conclusion about hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis 1. There is negative relationship between growth potential and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 2. There is negative relationship between liquidity by volume 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 3. There is positive relationship between free cash flow ratio 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 4. There is positive relation between higher leverage and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Accepted 
Hypothesis 5. There is positive relation between percentage of insider 
owners and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 6. There is negative relationship between importance of access 
to capital and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 7. There is positive relation between costs to be listed on stock 
exchange to net income as the performance indicator ratio and the decision 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 8. There is negative relation between the size of a company and 
its decision to go private. 
Accepted 
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After fitting the data to Cox Proportional Hazard model, it is interesting to estimate 
distribution of survival time over the stated period, the month was chosen as control. The figure 6 
represent with 95% level of confidence provides this information.  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of survival time over the stated period 
2.3.2. Model Diagnostics 
Cox Proportional Hazard model is linear and requires examining the fitness of such a 
regression model for sufficient description of data. The diagnostic was provided with application 
of methods of residuals [Therneau, 1999]  
Schoenfeld residuals test helps to examine proportional hazard. This test is implemented 
to significant coefficients. The output is provided in table 8. 
Table 8. Schoenfeld residuals test 
 
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Market -1.883e+00 1.521e-01 2.284e-01 -8.246 < 2e-16 ***
Liquidity -1.283e-07 1.086e+00 8.309e-08 -1.544 0.02917 *  
DE 2.419e-04 1.064e+00 1.006e-04 2.404 0.0162 *  
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP 6.878e-03 1.007e+00 2.982e-03 2.306 0.0211 * 
LnTA (SIZE) -8.953e-02 1.094e+00 4.417e-0 2.027 0.0427 *  
rho chisq p
Market -0.03982 0.44893 0.503
Liquidity 0.08776 1.01865 0.313
DE 0.00444 0.00438 0.947
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP 0.05230 0.68064 0.409
LnTA (SIZE) -0.10746 2.25979 0.133
GLOBAL NA 9.11644 0.195
Likelihood ratio test= 128.7  on 5 df,   p=<2e-16
Schoenfeld residuals
call: coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~ market + liquidity + DE + 
    insider_ownership + LnTA, data = dt)
n= 5472, number of events= 209 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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The proportional-hazard test estimates each variable as well as whole model (GLOBAL). 
The null hypothesis is no presence of non-proportional hazards for variables and model as a whole. 
Since p-values are more than 0,05 in each case, then the null hypothesis is accepted. As it is seen, 
there is strong argument that there are no non-proportional hazards for any significant variable. 
The global test with 3sof freedom shows the evidence of the non-proportional hazards’ absence.  
Observation of influences is checked via visualization of dfbeta values which measure the impact 
of an observation on a separate regression coefficient. The output of the test is provided on the 
figure 6.  
The graph shows the existence of influential observations. Nevertheless, the size and 
specific of sample allows to proceed with obtained results as the proportion is insufficient [Cook, 
1977]. There are ways to overcome the influential outliers by log or sqrt transformations. Despite 
this fact, it was concluded by the author of this research paper that using these tools do not have 
adequate effect on the whole model and particular variables. Moreover, the model becomes worse 
in its significance and in general more contradictory to previous investigation of other authors. 
This conclusion was made based on manual permutation and checking of variables in different 
forms.  
To sum up, survival model of Cox implemented on obtained data is considered to be 
appropriate and fitting.  
2.4. Analysis of subsamples 
The analysis of base model using the full sample of chosen listed on LSE companies 
showed that the type of market (Main or Alternative Investments) do matter in estimation of the 
probability to voluntary delist from the stock exchange. That is why two subsamples were checked 
for the relationships between dependent variable and independent ones using the same 
methodology but without including of the dummy.  
Main Market  
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model was applied to subsample consisted of companies 
traded on the Main Market of London Stock Exchange. As it was previously stated, the more 
mature and sustainable firms are listed there. The output of the estimation is provided in table 9. 
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Table 9. The output of Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Main Market) 
 
 All three tests checking significance show that the model is significant: the null hypothesis 
about insignificance is not accepted because p-values<0,05. Nevertheless, as in the previous time, 
not all of independent variables. Here it is seen that Liquidity, Debt-to-Equity, Insider ownership 
and Market-to-Book ratio are statistically significant and can be interpreted. Comparing with the 
base model, the variable which reflects the influence of the size of a company is not significant 
anymore, while growth potential via MB ratio becomes interesting for analysis.  
The Size covariate is not significant anymore. This fact can be explained by the specific of 
companies listed on Main Market. On the official web-site of LSE, it is stated that “The Main 
Market is London’s flagship market for larger, more established companies, and is home to some 
of the world’s largest and most well-known companies.” [LSE, 2018]. Thus, such companies are 
big by default and the variance in the size among them do not affect the decision to voluntary 
delist.  
 If in case of variables related to liquidity and insider ownership, the interpretation has 
common character with base model, then Market-to-Book ratio has its specifics. This covariate 
responses the growth potential and the perception of a company by a market. At the same time, 
the sustainability of companies from Main Market makes them be considered as suitable for IBO, 
MBO and MBI according to criteria for target firms taking part in such types of going private 
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Liquidity -6.709e-08 1.002e+00 8.008e-08 -0.838 0.04021 * 
FCF_ratio 1.753e-03 1.002e+00 4.582e-03 0.383 0.70200
GrSales  8.159e-04 1.001e+00  1.239e-03 0.658 0.51028
DE  4.391e-04 1.013e+00 1.776e-04 2.473 0.01341 * 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP1.179e-02 1.012e+00 4.672e-03 2.524 0.01159 *
MV_BV -2.872e-02 9.717e-01 1.056e-02 -2.720 0.00653 **
CAPEX_Sales1.046e-01 1.110e+00 1.886e-01 0.555 0.57912
ListC_NI -8.981e-04 9.991e-01 7.213e-03 -0.125 0.90090
LnTA (SIZE) -1.798e-02 9.822e-01 6.297e-02 -0.285 0.37527
Likelihood ratio test= 18.89  on 9 df,   p=0.03
Wald test = 22.45  on 9 df,   p=0.008
Score (logrank) test = 18.23  on 9 df,   p=0.03
Cox Proportional Harard Model
Call:  coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~  liquidity + FCF_ratio + 
    GrSales + DE + insider_ownership + mv_bv + capex_sales + 
    ListC_NI + LnTA, data = dt)
n= 2735, number of events= 86
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Concordance= 0.612  (se = 0.034 )
Rsquare= 0.007
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deals. With the matureness of a business, another struggle is coming: despite the stable cash flows 
and market position, it becomes harder to expand more. It means that if growth potential can be 
lower for such companies, then there is higher probability to go private as there is no need to carry 
listing cost while the processes for obtaining of positive cash flows are already set.  
 Exponential coefficient of significant variables can be interpreted as follow:  
- Liquidity: for each unit (in thousands) decrease in turnover the probability of voluntary delisting 
increases by 0,2%; 
- Debt-to-Equity Ratio: for each unit increase in leverage indicator the probability of going private 
increases by 1,3%; 
- Insider Ownership: for each unit increase in insider ownership the probability of voluntary 
delisting increases by 1,2%; 
- Market-to-Book ratio: for each unit increase in MB ratio the probability of voluntary delisting 
decrease by 2,83%. 
 The summary of analysis of hypotheses is provided in table 10. 
Table 10. Conclusion about hypotheses testing (Main Market) 
Hypothesis 1. There is negative relationship between growth potential and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted (in part of MB 
ratio) 
Hypothesis 2. There is negative relationship between liquidity by volume 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 3. There is positive relationship between free cash flow ratio 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 4. There is positive relation between higher leverage and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Accepted 
Hypothesis 5. There is positive relation between percentage of insider 
owners and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 6. There is negative relationship between importance of access 
to capital and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 7. There is positive relation between costs to be listed on stock 
exchange to net income as the performance indicator ratio and the decision 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 8. There is negative relation between the size of a company and 
its decision to go private. 
Not significant variable 
 
 The table 11 shows the output of model diagnostics for examination of proportional hazard. 
As the subsample is considered then test for influential observations can be skipped.    
 
 38 
Table 11. The model's diagnostics output 
 
 The proportional-hazard test demonstrates that no presence of non-proportional hazards for 
variables and model as the whole.  
 The figure 7 shows that the survival time for companies traded on Main Market are quite 
longer than in the base model, which also relates to the specifics of the subsample.  
 
Figure 7. Distribution of survival time over the stated period 
  
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Liquidity -8.450e-08 1.000e+00 7.591e-08 -1.113 0.00438 **
DE 4.819e-04 1.000e+00 1.530e-04  3.149 0.00164 **
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP 1.240e-02 1.012e+00 4.240e-03 2.923 0.00346 **
MV_BV -3.081e-02 9.697e-01 9.697e-03 -3.177 0.00149 **
rho chisq p
Liquidity 0.075814 2.39e-01 0.625
DE  0.000553 2.02e-05 0.996
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP0.042526 1.72e-01 0.678
MV_BV -0.032722 4.69e-02 0.829
GLOBAL NA 4.85e-01 0.975
Schoenfeld residuals
call: coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~  liquidity + DE + 
    insider_ownership + LnTA, data = dt)
n= 2735, number of events= 86 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Likelihood ratio test= 18.17  on 4 df,   p=0.001
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AIM  
 The subsample consisted of the companies traded on AIM was analyzed. The Cox 
Proportional Hazard model was applied as well. The output of the estimation is provided in table 
12.  
Table 12. The output of Cox Proportional Hazard Model (AIM) 
 
 As it is seen, the significance of the whole model according to Likelihood ratio test became 
less, however, in terms of this research and taking into consideration results of other two tests, the 
null hypothesis about insignificance of the model is not accepted on the 0,10. The range of the 
statistically significant independent variables is inside the base model, however, the liquidity does 
not matter anymore. According to the definition from official web site of LSE, “AIM is the London 
Stock Exchange’s international market for smaller growing companies. A wide range of businesses 
including early stage, venture capital backed as well as more established companies join AIM 
seeking access to growth capital.” [LSE, 2018].  This means that such companies are not attributed 
with high investors’ awareness and not tended to have high turnover. At the same time, significant 
covariates can be interpreted a bit in the other way from the base model. The main difference is 
the level of underlying risks. If it comes to leverage position, the positive relationship between 
debt-to-equity ratio and decision to go private correlates with the risk of not meeting of liabilities 
by the growth companies. The firms listed on the AIM market seek for a capital and their debt 
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Liquidity -2.694e-09 1.000e+00 1.366e-07 -0.020 0.284266
FCF_ratio -6.576e-06 1.000e+00 1.560e-05 -0.422 0.673344
GrSales -1.268e-0 1.000e+00 2.406e-05 -0.053 0.957955
DE 2.736e-04 1.064e+00 1.227e-04 2.230 0.025726 *
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP2.875e-03 1.003e+00 3.797e-03 0.757 0.048945 *
MV_BV -3.406e-04 9.997e-01 4.343e-03 -0.078 0.937487
CAPEX_Sales-8.622e-04 9.991e-01 6.059e-03 -0.142 0.886842 
ListC_NI -5.940e-03 9.941e-01 4.420e-02 -0.134 0.893096
LnTA (SIZE) -2.257e-0 1.092e+00 6.452e-02 -3.498 0.000469 ***
Likelihood ratio test= 16.17  on 9 df,   p=0.06
Wald test = 17.83  on 9 df,   p=0.04
Score (logrank) test = 16.65  on 9 df,   p=0.05
Cox Proportional Harard Model
Call:  coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~ market + liquidity + FCF_ratio + 
    GrSales + DE + insider_ownership + mv_bv + capex_sales + 
    ListC_NI + LnTA, data = dt)
n= 2737, number of events= 124
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Concordance= 0.598  (se = 0.03 )
Rsquare= 0.006  
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position can be high as well due to necessity in resources for development. At the same time, these 
companies are not that mature as ones from Main Market, so they may have less expertise in 
management of debt load. It leads to arising risk of bankruptcy, for example. In order not to be 
forced delisted, these firms prefer to go private. Variables which is responsible for insider 
ownership and size of a firm in case of AIM companies also can have similar explanation of 
influence as in the base model. Nevertheless, looking at table 13, it is seen that average percentage 
of insider ownership for companies traded on AIM is more than twice higher than for firms from 
Main Market.  This means that owners of young companies being at the stage of growth keep 
higher level of control over their business. It is logical that such companies with primary goal in 
arising the capital to develop are more interested in keeping the reins. Moreover, it can be vital as 
firms from AIM are often use innovative business models which might be complicated for an 
external participant’s understanding, which would lead to great agency problems.   
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics for Comparable Variable 
 
Also, it is interesting to see how the significance of the size covariate has increased 
comparing with base model. It can be explicated by the specifics of the market. 
Exponential coefficient of significant variables can be interpreted as follow:  
- Debt-to-Equity Ratio: for each unit increase in leverage indicator the probability of going private 
increases by 6,4%; 
- Insider Ownership: for each unit increase in insider ownership the probability of voluntary 
delisting increases by 0,3%; 
- Size as Ln(Total Assets): for each unit increase in MB ratio the probability of voluntary delisting 
decrease by 9,2%. 
 The summary of analysis of hypotheses is provided in table 14. 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP (MM) INSIDER_OWNERSHIP (AIM)
Mean 19,80 43,46
Standart Error 0,42 0,47
Median 11,37 43,01
Mode 0,25 38,20
Standart Deviation 21,90 24,48
Sample Variance 479,76 599,05
Kurtosis 0,49 -0,79
Skewness 1,17 0,18
Range 99,61 99,84
Minimum 0,00 0,02
Maximum 99,61 99,86
Sum 54151,52 118955,98
Count 2735 2737
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Table 14. Conclusion about hypotheses testing (AIM) 
Hypothesis 1. There is negative relationship between growth potential and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 2. There is negative relationship between liquidity by volume 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 3. There is positive relationship between free cash flow ratio 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 4. There is positive relation between higher leverage and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Accepted 
Hypothesis 5. There is positive relation between percentage of insider 
owners and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 6. There is negative relationship between importance of access 
to capital and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 7. There is positive relation between costs to be listed on stock 
exchange to net income as the performance indicator ratio and the decision 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant variable 
Hypothesis 8. There is negative relation between the size of a company and 
its decision to go private. 
Accepted 
 
The table 15 shows the output of model diagnostics for examination of proportional hazard. 
As the subsample is considered then test for influential observations can be skipped.    
Table 15. The model's diagnostics output 
 
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
Liquidity -1.996e-09 1.000e+00 1.360e-07 -0.015 0.08830 .
DE 2.717e-04 1.000e+00 1.208e-04 2.249 0.02449 * 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP2.834e-03 1.003e+00 3.792e-03 0.747 0.04488 * 
LnTA (SIZE) -2.240e-01 1.251e+00 6.445e-02 -3.476 0.00051 ***
rho chisq p
Liquidity  0.09792 0.64701 0.421
DE 0.00769 0.00712 0.933
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP0.01126 0.01721 0.896
LnTA (SIZE) 0.04369 0.25410 0.614
GLOBAL NA 0.97562 0.913
Schoenfeld residuals
call: coxph(formula = Surv(Age, G_private) ~ market + liquidity + DE + 
    insider_ownership + LnTA, data = dt)
n= 2737, number of events= 124 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Likelihood ratio test= 15.75  on 4 df,   p=0.003
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The proportional-hazard test demonstrates that no presence of non-proportional hazards for 
variables and model as the whole.  
 The figure 8 shows that the survival time for companies traded on AIM are much shorter 
than in base model or comparing to Main Market, which also relates to the specifics of the 
subsample: smaller growing companies are less stable and have lower potential to stay public for 
a long time due to overestimation of cost-benefit tradeoff as well as underestimation of 
corresponded agency problems 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of survival time over the stated period 
2.5. Summary of analysis (base model and subsamples) 
 After theoretical overview of the delisting phenomenon with focus on voluntary type, the 
analysis of collected data with application of Cox Proportional Hazard Model as most appropriate 
for such kind of binary choice was conducted. Eight hypotheses were formulated and checked on 
the whole sample and then subsamples. Subsamples were organized depending on the type of LSE 
Market: Main Market or AIM. The decision about checking subsamples was made after conclusion 
that dummy variable does matter. The summary table 16 represents hypotheses testing results.  
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Table 16. Summary of hypotheses testing results 
 Base Model Main Market AIM 
Hypothesis 1. There is negative relationship 
between growth potential and the decision to 
voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant 
variable 
Accepted (in 
part of MB 
ratio) 
Not significant 
variable 
Hypothesis 2. There is negative relationship 
between liquidity by volume and the decision 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted Accepted 
Not significant 
variable 
Hypothesis 3. There is positive relationship 
between free cash flow ratio and the decision 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Hypothesis 4. There is positive relation 
between higher leverage and the decision to 
voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
Accepted Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 5. There is positive relation 
between percentage of insider owners and the 
decision to voluntary delist from stock 
exchange. 
Accepted Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 6. There is negative relationship 
between importance of access to capital and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock 
exchange. 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Hypothesis 7. There is positive relation 
between costs to be listed on stock exchange 
to net income as the performance indicator 
ratio and the decision to voluntary delist from 
stock exchange. 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Not significant 
variable 
Hypothesis 8. There is negative relation 
between the size of a company and its 
decision to go private. 
Accepted 
Not significant 
variable 
Accepted 
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The summary of analysis is provided in table 17. 
Table 17. Summary of conducted analysis 
Base Model 
Accepted Hypotheses Inference 
- There is negative relationship between liquidity by 
volume and the decision to voluntary delist from 
stock exchange; 
- There is positive relation between higher leverage 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock 
exchange; 
- There is positive relation between percentage of 
insider owners and the decision to voluntary delist 
from stock exchange; 
- There is negative relation between the size of a 
company and its decision to go private. 
The analysis of the full sample consisted of 
companies from both LSE markets showed that 
there several factors among the chosen scope, which 
can affect a firm’s decision to go private. Among 
them, liquidity estimated as turnover of shares on 
the stock exchange, financial leverage, the 
percentage of insiders in ownership structure and the 
size of a company. These four indicators can be first 
signals for beneficiaries of going out transactions. 
Subsamples 
Main Market AIM 
Accepted Hypotheses 
- There is negative relationship between growth 
potential and the decision to voluntary delist from 
stock exchange (in part of MB ratio); 
- There is negative relationship between liquidity by 
volume and the decision to voluntary delist from 
stock exchange; 
- There is positive relation between higher leverage 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock 
exchange; 
- There is positive relation between percentage of 
insider owners and the decision to voluntary delist 
from stock exchange. 
- There is positive relation between higher leverage 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock 
exchange; 
- There is positive relation between percentage of 
insider owners and the decision to voluntary delist 
from stock exchange; 
- There is negative relation between the size of a 
company and its decision to go private. 
Inference 
The estimated model applied to subsample of 
companies from Main Market showed that the base 
model results can be applicable for particular 
market, however, with the limitation. The size is not 
trigger for paying attention on a company as on a 
potential delisted due to specifics of Main Marker. 
At the same time, the growth potential becomes 
more important for checking. 
The estimated model applied to subsample of 
companies from AIM showed that the base model 
results can be applied partly. The intensity of share’s 
turnover is not the trigger for smaller growth 
companies. Meanwhile, the interpretation of 
leverage in terms of companies traded on AIM has 
changed in the way of risk exposure. 
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2.6. Managerial implication 
The conducted research has implication for different stakeholders. Among them: 
1) Managers of institutional players; 
2) Managers of companies who are responsible for investing activities; 
3) Individual investors; 
4) Owners of listed companies on London Stock Exchange. 
For 3 first groups this research paper and the suggested investment strategy may be used 
as a tool for wealth management.  
Investment strategies are provided in table 18:  
Table 18. Implication for groups 1-3: managers of institutional players, managers of companies who are responsible for 
investing activities and individual investors 
Market Triggers for delisting to focus on 
London Stock 
Exchange 
• Presence of a company on AIM increase the probability of going 
private by 15,24% while other factors are constant. Thus, for playing 
against market within general, it is reasonable to choose AIM; 
• The focus on liquidity performance and size parameters are 
important for monitoring. Any dropping fluctuation in turnover by 
volume and total assets can increase the probability that a company 
will voluntary delist from stock exchange; 
• In case if a company’s leverage has the tendency to increase, then it 
is a signal to pay attention to such a company as the probability of its 
going private is increasing.; 
• If in a company’s ownership structure the significant part is hold by 
insiders, then such a company is more likely to go private comparing 
with other where stocks in free float are distributed mostly among 
external investors.  
Main Market 
• Choosing Main Market to monitor companies there, there is no sense 
to pay attention on the size of a company since the market is 
characterized by presence of large and mature firms; 
• Fluctuations in growth potential estimated as Market-to-Book value 
can signal about the probability to go private. Companies with lower 
growth potential are more likely to go private since stable position 
and constant positive cash flows allow to reduce costs corresponded 
to listing on the stock exchange; 
• The pattern of attitude to liquidity, leverage and insider ownership 
remains the same as in the case of LSE in general.  
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AIM 
• Choosing AIM to monitor companies there, the horizon of overview 
is changed: the information about turnover of shares becomes 
irrelevant; 
• The pattern of attitude to leverage and size remains the same as in 
the case of LSE in general; 
• In case if a company traded on AIM has high leverage (Debt-to-
Equity ratio), then it is reasonable to monitor such a firm as it can 
higher probability to go private. Nevertheless, it is important to 
notice that having large debt load for a small growing company can 
be risky because of lack of experience in liabilities’ management. 
Therefore, a firm from AIM with high leverage is also tended to be 
involuntary delisted, which is not favorable situation for potential 
beneficiaries.  
 
For last group of possible users of this research paper the implementation relates to 
corporate governance and argumentative decision making to go private based on proved 
hypotheses tested in the work. Again, these decisions depend on the market or/and sector where 
the company is traded. The implication for owners of listed companies on London Stock Exchange 
is provided in table 19:  
Table 19. Implication for owners of listed companies on London Stock Exchange 
Market Reason to consider going private 
London Stock 
Exchange 
• If the size of a company is not that big and the situation does not 
improve over time, then it could be not beneficial to stay listed and 
bear the costs related to public status. The cost-benefit tradeoff can 
be imbalanced; 
• If the liquidity of a company’s stocks is dropping down, then it is 
signal either of considering going private or enhance efforts for 
increase of turnover. Without this action, each thousands of 
decrease in volume will decrease the level of cost-benefit tradeoff 
for 0,1%; 
• If the big portion of a company’s stocks is already owned by 
insiders, it can be reasonable to discuss possibility to go private in 
case of the presence of agency problems on the background; 
• In case of the debt ratio’s increase, it is wise to overview the option 
to voluntary delist from stock exchange for restructuring of the 
liabilities’ load. For instance, go private via buying out by private 
equity fund.  
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Main Market 
• If it is noticed that Market-to-Book ratio has the tendency to 
decrease, then it might be considered as the reason to think in the 
way of going private. The reason is that low growth potential or 
even just a perception of the market about it make doubts about the 
significance and necessity to be listed. Being a large and 
sustainable company, it can be more favorable to voluntary delist in 
order to decrease associated costs while cash flows are positively 
stable.   
AIM 
• In case of a high leverage, it can be reasonable to pay big attention 
on debt management for understanding the risks associated with 
liabilities. If there is board line situation and there is no confidence, 
it is vital to think about going private voluntary before this process 
will be forced. 
 
2.6. Research limitations 
The conducted research has a number of limitations:  
1) The sample was significantly cut because of non-availability of data for all variables for all 
companies in primary sample. The final number of observation is 5472 for period from 2009 
to 2017 including Main Market and AIM.  
2) Fixed Listing Costs were computed as the sum of auditor fees and annual fee of LSE 
depending on the market (Main Market or AIM). This approach is considered to be 
simplified and does not take into account other associated fixed costs for more complex 
analysis of this factor. The reason is availability of data in open sources.  
3) The research is conducted for London Stock Exchange only, thus, application of results on 
other markets is not proven.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This research paper is devoted to voluntary delisting phenomenon. The goal of the study 
was to identify drivers of delisting process in order to build investment strategy for potential 
beneficiaries of the going private transactions. The research was conducted on the example of 
London Stock Exchange. At the result, the recommendations for 4 groups of stakeholders as 
potential beneficiaries were suggested on the base of conducted analysis. Since to obtain 
measurement gain from going private transactions, the beneficiary should be shareholder, then the 
topic of this master thesis matches the main aim. 
 First of all, the theoretical base was overviewed for better understanding of the nature and 
main principles of voluntary delisting phenomenon. It was started with the stating the fact that 
going private transactions are considered to be opposite to IPOs. Therefore, the analysis started 
from the analysis of reasons of companies to become public. Afterwards, the corresponding with 
being listed direct and indirect costs were discussed based on the literature review and credited 
previous studies. The overviewed reasons formed the comprehension of factors which affect a 
company’s decision to go private. All the factors were divided into two groups associated with 
cost-benefit tradeoff and agency costs. 
 For becoming private company after being traded on a stock exchange, a company should 
complete the procedures which will lead to change of the status. In the first chapter was considered 
different types of public-to-private transactions among which the most wide-spread: LBOs, 
MBOs/MBIs and M&A deals. 
 Since this research paper  seeks to propose managerial implication, the case study of the 
Cadbury’s buying out by Kraft Foods with following retention of the target company’s 
management team and its independence inside US public company. The acquisition increased the 
wealth of shareholders. At the same time, on the example, there were touched the factors which 
found their effect on the decision of the Cadbury with 184 years heritage to be taken-over by 
foreign player. This case showed the transaction peculiarities and gave the understanding of 
premium formation via real world situation.  
 After paying attention on main components of voluntary delisting, several hypotheses were 
formulated with again reviewing of theoretical background of the research problem. Next 
hypotheses were suggested for testing:  
Hypothesis 1. (cost-benefit trade off group) There is negative relationship between growth 
potential and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Hypothesis 2. (cost-benefit trade off group) There is negative relationship between liquidity by 
volume and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
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Hypothesis 3. (agency costs group) There is positive relationship between free cash flow ratio and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Hypothesis 4. (cost-benefit trade off group) There is positive relation between higher leverage and 
the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Hypothesis 5. (agency costs group) There is positive relation between percentage of insider owners 
and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Hypothesis 6. (cost-benefit trade off group/agency costs group) There is negative relationship 
between importance of access to capital and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange.  
Hypothesis 7. (cost-benefit trade off group) There is positive relation between costs to be listed on 
stock exchange to net income as the performance indicator ratio and the decision to voluntary 
delist from stock exchange. 
Hypothesis 8. (cost-benefit trade off group) There is negative relation between the size of a 
company and the decision to voluntary delist from stock exchange. 
 The results of empirical study which was conducted with the sample of companies from 
LSE both Main Market and AIM in period from 2009 to 2017 showed significant results. The base 
model and models for subsamples with tightness to markets were tested for their significance and 
independent variables included. The resume is provided in table 20 where significant factors 
affected delisting decision with their signs are represented.  
Table 20. Comparison of the models' significant covariates 
Base Model Main Market AIM 
Liquidity (-) Liquidity (-) Debt-to-Equity Ratio (+) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (+) Debt-to-Equity Ratio (+) Insider Ownership (+) 
Insider Ownership (+) Insider Ownership (+) Size (-) 
Size (-) Market-to-Book Ratio (-)  
Dummy: Market   
 
 After analysis of the output with application of theoretical base, the managerial 
implications were suggested and provided in corresponding part of this research paper. The 
recommendations are presented in tables for distribution among particular target groups and 
considered to be user-friendly and adopted for different level of diving into voluntary delisting 
topic.  The managerial implications suggest built investment strategy for those who are interested 
in obtaining benefits from delisting transactions, for instance, due to received premium during 
buying out process.  
 Nevertheless, this research has number of limitations regarding data access, analysis 
conducted only for LSE and, finally, about peculiarities of computations of the listing costs. 
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Moreover, there is field for further research using the suggested concepts. For example, 
introduction of other variables in the model. Due to characteristics of the Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model chosen for the study, it is not required to adopt the specific mix of variables, but it is possible 
to enter new one and exclude some based on the assumptions of next researchers.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Testing influential observations 
 
  
 58 
Appendix 2. Code for R (base model) 
library(survival) 
library(dplyr) 
library(corr2D) 
library(corrplot) 
library(PerformanceAnalytics) 
library(unfoldr) 
library(survminer) 
library(ggplot2) 
setwd("/Users/user/Desktop/Delisting") 
dt <- read.csv2("No_Ommited2.csv", header = T, as.is = T) 
head(dt) 
summary(dt) 
cor(dt[,-1], method = "pearson") 
names(dt) <- c("company", "market", "liquidity", "FCF_ratio", "GrSales", "DE", 
"insider_ownership", "mv_bv",  
               "capex_sales","ListC_NI", "LnTA", "Age", "G_private") 
dt$market <- factor(dt$market) 
dt$mv_bv <- as.numeric(sub(",", ".", dt$mv_bv, fixed = TRUE)) 
dt <- na.omit(dt) 
table(dt$G_private) 
dt$g_private_2 <- NA 
dt$g_private_2[dt$G_private == 1] <- 0 
dt$g_private_2[dt$G_private == 0] <- 1 
model <- coxph(Surv(Age, G_private) ~ 
                 market + liquidity + FCF_ratio + GrSales + DE + insider_ownership + mv_bv + 
capex_sales + ListC_NI + LnTA, 
               data = dt) 
for_cor <- dt[,names(dt) %in% c("liquidity", "FCF_ratio", "GrSales", "DE", 
"insider_ownership", "mv_bv",  
                                "capex_sales","ListC_NI", "LnTA", "Age")] 
cor_matrix <- cor(for_cor, method = "pearson") 
summary(model) 
dt$age_month <- round(dt$Age / 30, 0) 
model2 <- coxph(Surv(age_month, G_private) ~ 
                 market + liquidity + FCF_ratio + GrSales + DE + insider_ownership + mv_bv + 
capex_sales + ListC_NI + LnTA, 
               data = dt) 
plot(survfit(model2), ylim=c(0.7,1), xlab="Months", 
    ylab = "Proportion of Not Delisted") 
residuals(model, "scaledsch")                          
modelres1 <- coxph(Surv(Age,G_private)~formula = formula 
                     market + liquidity + DE + insider_ownership + LnTA,data = dt) 
modelres2 <- coxph(Surv(age_month,G_private)~ 
                     market + liquidity + DE + insider_ownership + LnTA,data = dt) 
dt$age_years <- round(dt$Age / 365, 0)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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modelres3 <- coxph(Surv(age_years,G_private)~ 
                     market + liquidity + DE + insider_ownership + LnTA,data = dt) 
summary(modelres1) 
cox.zph(modelres1) 
dfbeta <- residuals(modelres1, type="dfbeta") 
par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
for (j in 1:5) {plot(dfbeta[, j], ylab=names(coef(modelres1))[j]) 
       abline (h=0,lty=2)} 
#"Age", "LnTA", "liquidity", "DE", "insider_ownership" 
par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
res <- residuals(modelres1, type = "martingale") 
X <- as.matrix(dt[, c("insider_ownership")]) 
par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
for (j in 1:2) {plot(X[, j], res, xlab=c("insider_ownership")[j], ylab="residuals") 
 abline(h=0, lty=1)                                                                                                  
lines(lowess(X[, j], res, iter=0))} 
b <- coef(modelres1) [c(6)] 
test.ph <- cox.zph(modelres3) 
test.ph 
ggcoxzph(test.ph) 
ggcoxdiagnostics(modelres1, type = "dfbeta", linear.predictions = TRUE, ggtheme = 
theme_bw())                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
ggcoxdiagnostics(modelres1, type = "martingale", linear.predictions = FALSE, ggtheme = 
theme_bw()) 
ggcoxdiagnostics(modelres1, type = "deviance", linear.predictions = FALSE, ggtheme = 
theme_bw()) 
ggcoxfunctional(Surv(Age,G_private)~ 
                  liquidity + log(liquidity) + sqrt(liquidity),data = dt) 
coxph(Surv(age_years,G_private) ~ LnTA + pspline(liquidity), dt)  
ggcoxfunctional(Surv(age_years,G_private)~ 
                      liquidity + log(liquidity) + I(sqrt(liquidity)),data = dt, 
                point.col = "white", point.alpha = 0.5, ggtheme = theme_dark()) 
 
 
 
 
 
